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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The States adopt the government‘s jurisdictional statement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Congress‘s authority to regulate interstate commerce 
includes the power to compel individuals to enter into commerce so that the federal 
government may regulate them. 
2. Whether it is coercive for Congress to condition all existing federal 
Medicaid funding ― billions of dollars representing approximately 40% of all 
federal funding to the States ― on the States‘ acceptance of new expansions to the 
Medicaid program. 
3. Whether the unconstitutional provisions are non-severable from the 
remainder of the Act given their close relationship and the Government‘s repeated 
insistence that the individual mandate is necessary for the Act‘s other insurance 
reforms. 
4. Whether all or only some of the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge 
the individual mandate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is an extraordinary law that 
rests on unprecedented assertions of federal power.  In at least two respects, the 
Act pushes even the most expansive conception of the federal government‘s 
constitutional powers past the breaking point.  First, the Act imposes a direct 
mandate upon individuals to obtain health insurance, marking by all accounts the 
first time in our Nation‘s history that Congress has required individuals to enter 
into commerce as a condition of living in the United States.  The federal 
government identifies no limiting principle that would prevent Congress from 
employing that same power to force individuals to engage in any manner of 
commerce so that the federal government may better regulate it.  Instead, the 
federal government embraces a sweeping view of the Commerce Clause — broad 
enough to reach any subject and encompassing enough to include the power to 
compel — that would imperil individual liberty, render Congress‘s other 
enumerated powers superfluous, and allow Congress to usurp the general police 
power reserved to the States. 
Second, the Act‘s expansion of the Medicaid program is based on an equally 
boundless interpretation of Congress‘s spending power, which would render any 
remaining limits on Congress‘s enumerated powers illusory.  By piling new 
conditions on enormous pre-existing blocks of federal grants — literally billions of 
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dollars — Congress has given the States no practical choice but to comply.  No 
meaningful assessment of the new marginal requirements is possible when the 
consequences of non-acquiescence are the loss of such enormous sums.  That is 
true no matter how problematic the new requirements are and no matter how 
intrusive on State prerogatives.  To characterize such tactics as anything less than 
coercion is to deny that spending legislation can ever be impermissibly coercive; 
indeed, that is the government‘s position. 
If this Court were to uphold those assertions of federal power, there would 
remain little if any power ―reserved to the States … or to the people.‖  U.S. Const. 
amend. X.  Because that is plainly not the federal government that the Constitution 
envisions, the district court correctly concluded that the Act is unconstitutional.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a facial challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (―HCERA‖), Pub. L. No. 111-152 (collectively, ―the 
ACA‖ or ―the Act‖).  Plaintiffs are twenty-six States, two individuals, and the 
National Federation of Independent Business.  They brought this action seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Act is invalid in its entirety 
because four of its five core provisions exceed Congress‘s constitutional authority, 
and none is severable from the rest of the Act. 
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Plaintiffs‘ second amended complaint included six causes of action; the 
district court dismissed four.  Record Excerpts (―R.E.‖) 1966–2000; 379–443.  The 
case proceeded to summary judgment on the two remaining claims:  (1) that the 
Act‘s mandate that each individual maintain a minimum level of health insurance 
exceeds Congress‘s enumerated powers; and (2) that, as amended by the Act, the 
Medicaid program is impermissibly coercive and therefore exceeds Congress‘s 
spending power.  The district court granted the Plaintiffs summary judgment on 
their claim that Congress lacked authority to enact the individual mandate, but 
granted the government summary judgment on the Plaintiffs‘ claim that the Act‘s 
Medicaid amendments exceed Congress‘s spending authority.  R.E. 2002–64. 
The court also concluded that the individual mandate could not be severed 
from the rest of the Act, and it therefore declared the Act invalid in its entirety.  
R.E. 2064–75, 2080.  The government filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2011, 
and the Plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal on March 10, 2011.  R.E. 2149, 
2152. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Affordable Care Act 
The ACA is a 2,700-page collection of wide-ranging federal innovations 
intended to impose ―near-universal‖ health insurance coverage on the Nation.  
ACA § 1501(a)(1)(D).  The Act has five central components: (1) a mandate that 
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nearly all individuals maintain a minimum level of insurance, ACA § 1501(b); 
(2) the creation in each State of ―health benefit exchanges,‖ administered by either 
the state or federal government, on which individuals and small businesses can 
pool their purchasing power to obtain insurance, ACA § 1311; (3) a set of 
mandates and incentives for employers, including the States, designed to require or 
encourage the expansion of employer-sponsored insurance, ACA §§ 1001, 1511, 
1513; (4) a substantial expansion of Medicaid eligibility and coverage, as well as 
tax credits for insurance purchased by needier individuals, ACA §§ 2001, 1401, 
1402; and (5) so-called ―guaranteed-issue reforms,‖ which prohibit insurers from 
denying, canceling, capping, or increasing the cost of coverage based on an 
individual‘s pre-existing conditions or history, ACA § 1001. 
These appeals focus primarily on two of the Act‘s core provisions:  the 
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. 
1. The Individual Mandate 
The ACA mandates that each ―applicable individual shall for each month 
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential 
coverage for such month.‖  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).  This mandate to maintain 
health insurance applies to all individuals except foreign nationals residing here 
unlawfully, incarcerated individuals, and individuals falling within two narrow 
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religious exemptions.  Id. § 5000A(d).  A covered individual who fails to comply 
with the mandate is subject to a financial ―penalty.‖  Id. § 5000A(b)(1), (c). 
2. The Medicaid Expansion 
Originally conceived in 1965, Medicaid was designed as a cooperative 
program whereby Congress offered funding to any State that volunteered to 
establish a health insurance plan for needy residents.  See Social Security Act of 
1965, Title XIX, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.  At its inception, the program 
covered approximately 4 million individuals and cost about $1 billion.  John 
Klemm, Ph.D., Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 Health Care Fin. Rev. 105, 
106 (Fall 2000).  It has since expanded dramatically, and is now the single largest 
federal grant-in-aid program to the States.  Medicaid now accounts for more than 
40% of all federal funds dispersed to the States — $251 billion in 2009 alone — 
and approximately 7% of all federal spending.  See The Long-Term Budget 
Outlook, June 2010, CBO, at 7, 30, available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11579/06-30-LTBO.pdf; Budget of the 
United States Government: State-by-State Tables Fiscal Year 2010, available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/sheets/bis/8_3.xls.  The majority of 
States receive at least $1 billion each year in federal Medicaid funding, which 
covers at least half of each State‘s total Medicaid costs.  R.E. 1551–55. 
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The ACA substantially expands the eligibility and coverage thresholds that 
States must adopt and enforce to remain eligible to participate in Medicaid, as well 
as the States‘ burdens and costs.  Whereas Medicaid previously gave States 
substantial discretion in determining eligibility based on federal poverty levels, the 
ACA requires States to provide Medicaid to individuals with incomes up to 133% 
of the poverty level (with a 5% ―income disregard‖ provision that effectively raises 
that number to 138%, HCERA § 1004(b)).  ACA § 2001(a).  Although the federal 
government will initially fund 100% of the expanded benefits, the States are 
responsible for significant administrative expenses; Congress also provided no 
increased funding for the millions of individuals, who are currently eligible but not 
enrolled, who will be forced into the program to comply with the individual 
mandate.  See R.E. 523-24, 573-74, 600-02, 613, 637, 643, 675, 705, 709, 792-94, 
801-04.  Moreover, by 2017, States will be responsible for 5% of the costs of the 
new benefits, with that number increasing to 10% by 2020.  HCERA § 1201.  
The Act establishes a new ―minimum essential coverage‖ level that States 
must provide to Medicaid recipients, thereby eliminating much of the flexibility 
States previously possessed to determine what level of coverage to provide.  ACA 
§ 2001(a)(2).  It also imposes a ―maintenance of effort‖ condition, which requires 
that, until a State‘s approved health insurance exchange is fully operational, a State 
―shall not have in effect eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures … that 
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are more restrictive than  [those] in effect on the date of enactment of the [ACA].‖  
Id. § 2001(b).  That requirement locks each State into its previously voluntary 
coverage decisions, whatever they might have been.  Finally, the Act requires the 
States not only to pay the costs of care and services, but also to assume 
responsibility for providing ―the care and services themselves.‖  ACA § 2304.  The 
added burdens, costs and liabilities from this new requirement — particularly in 
the face of federal projections of severe provider shortages — are incalculable, but 
sure to be substantial, underscoring that the ACA transforms Medicaid well 
beyond anything the States volunteered to implement.  In conjunction with these 
expansions, the government predicts that federal Medicaid spending will increase 
by another $434 billion by the end of the decade.  R.E. 1425.   
Congress did not impose the Act‘s additional Medicaid provisions as a 
condition of accepting new federal funding.  It instead conditioned each State‘s 
entire federal Medicaid grant — on average, at least a billion dollars — on 
adoption of the Act‘s substantial expansions of state obligations under the 
program.  R.E. 104; see also Julie Stone et al., Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Provisions in PPACA, Cong. Research Serv., 
April 28, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/healthcare/ 
medicaid/Documents/CRS%20Report%204_28_10.pdf (―the law requires states to 
expand Medicaid‖). 
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B. District Court Proceedings 
Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Plaintiffs brought this action 
seeking a declaration that the ACA is unconstitutional. 
1. Motion to Dismiss 
The district court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants‘ motion 
to dismiss Plaintiffs‘ amended complaint.  R.E. 379–443.  The court rejected the 
federal government‘s standing objections.  R.E. 408–18.  In doing so, the court 
noted that the government did not challenge the States‘ standing to challenge the 
ACA‘s amendments to Medicaid.  R.E. 408. 
Turning to the merits, the district court dismissed the States‘ Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the mandate (as applied to the States) that employers 
provide health insurance to employees, as well as the States‘ claim that the 
provisions concerning health benefit exchanges commandeered state governments 
in violation of the Tenth Amendment.  R.E. 420–28.  The court determined that 
those claims were precluded by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
The district court denied the government‘s motion to dismiss the States‘ 
challenge to the individual mandate, noting that its decision was ―not even a close 
call‖ given that ―[t]he power that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply 
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without prior precedent.‖  R.E. 439.  The court also concluded that Congress 
intended the penalty for violating the mandate to be a regulatory penalty, as 
opposed to a tax subject to Congress‘s taxing authority.  R.E. 385–407. 
The district court further denied the government‘s motion to dismiss the 
States‘ claim that the Medicaid amendments exceed Congress‘s authority to attach 
conditions to the States‘ acceptance of federal funding.  The court concluded that, 
―[i]f the Supreme Court meant what it said in [South Dakota v.] Dole[, 483 U.S. 
203, 211 (1987)] and Steward Machine Co. [v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)] , 
there is a line somewhere between mere pressure and impermissible coercion,‖ and 
the ACA‘s requirement that States accept all changes to the Medicaid program as a 
condition of receiving any federal Medicaid funds arguably fell on the 
impermissibly coercive side of the line.  R.E. 434.   
2. Motions for Summary Judgment 
After the parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court 
found that each of the individual Plaintiffs and the NFIB had standing to challenge 
the individual mandate.  It further found that at least two States (Idaho and Utah) 
also had standing because the individual mandate conflicts with State laws 
declaring that those States‘ citizens may not be compelled to obtain healthcare.  
R.E. 2017–19.  Thus, there was no ―need to discuss the standing issue with respect 
to the other state plaintiffs, or the other asserted bases for standing.‖  R.E. 2019. 
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On the merits, the district court noted that the individual mandate is an 
unprecedented form of federal action — ―Never before has Congress required that 
everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being 
alive and residing in the United States.‖  R.E. 2039.  The court explained that ―an 
‗absence of power‘ might reasonably be inferred where — as here — ‗earlier 
Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power.‘‖  R.E. 2040 (quoting 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 908 (1997)). 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the district court determined, ―some 
type of already-existing activity or undertaking‖ is a ―prerequisite to the exercise 
of the commerce power.‖  R.E. 2044.  Congress therefore cannot ―penalize a 
passive individual for failing to engage in commerce.‖  R.E. 2043.  If Congress 
could do so, the court concluded, ―the enumeration of powers in the Constitution 
would have been in vain for it would be ‗difficult to perceive any limitation on 
federal power.‘‖  R.E. 2043 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 
(1995)). 
Applying those principles, the court determined that the individual mandate 
―regulates inactivity,‖ that is, it applies to every person ―who ‗fails‘ to act pursuant 
to the congressional dictate‖ to obtain health insurance.  R.E. 2045.  The court 
rejected the defendants‘ argument that ―unique‖ features of the health care market 
justify treating the ―mere status of being without health insurance‖ as economic 
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activity.  R.E.  2051.  The court reasoned that while ―every market problem is, at 
some level and in some respects, unique,‖ the purported uniqueness of the problem 
does not justify a solution that exceeds Congress‘s enumerated powers.  R.E. 2050.  
Moreover, the court found that the supposedly unique features of the health care 
market — that every individual is susceptible to illness or injury and that the costs 
of care are sometimes shifted to others — are not unique because one or both of 
these properties exist in other markets for basic goods and services such as food, 
transportation, and housing.  R.E. 2047–49.  The court also rejected the 
defendants‘ argument that Congress can regulate the ―decision‖ not to purchase 
health insurance, concluding that authority to regulate mere decisions not to 
engage in activity ―would essentially have unlimited application.‖  R.E. 2054. 
The district court further held that the individual mandate could not be 
justified as a ―necessary and proper‖ means of executing Congress‘s power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate insurance companies‘ underwriting practices.  
The individual mandate is not an ―appropriate‖ means of achieving that goal, the 
court held, because it would undermine the ―‗essential attributes‘ of the Commerce 
Clause limitations on the federal government‘s power,‖ such that it is ―neither 
within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution.‖  R.E. 2063.  The court also 
observed that the government‘s reasoning that the individual mandate was 
necessary to counteract the incentives created by other federal policies would 
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―have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or 
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more 
dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or ‗necessary‘ the 
statutory fix.‖  R.E. 2061. 
Turning to Medicaid, the district court granted the Defendants summary 
judgment on the States‘ coercion claim.  R.E. 2007-14.  Notwithstanding its earlier 
acknowledgement that Dole and Steward Machine recognize a line between 
pressure and coercion, the court concluded that it would be too difficult to 
distinguish between pressure and coercion.  R.E. 2009.   
Finally, the court concluded that the individual mandate cannot be severed 
from the rest of the Act.  The court first noted that, in light of the government‘s 
concession that ―the individual mandate and the Act‘s health insurance reforms … 
will rise or fall together,‖ ―the only question is whether the Act‘s other, non-health-
insurance-related provisions can stand independently.‖  R.E. 2064-65. 
Examining Congress‘s intent, the court found it significant that a severability 
clause ―had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but … was removed in 
the bill that subsequently became law.‖  R.E. 2068.  The court next found the 
government‘s concession that the Act‘s insurance reforms must fall with the 
mandate ―extremely significant because the various insurance provisions, in turn, 
are the very heart of the Act itself.‖  R.E. 2069.  Examining the remainder of the 
14 
 
Act, the court concluded that, because of the inter-relatedness of the Act‘s various 
provisions, ―[i]t would be impossible to ascertain on a section-by-section basis if 
any particular statutory provision could stand (and was intended by Congress to 
stand) independent of the individual mandate,‖ and trying do so would ―be 
tantamount to rewriting a statute in an attempt to salvage it.‖  R.E. 2074. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo the constitutionality of an act of Congress.  Gulf 
Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The individual mandate is an unprecedented assertion of a power 
Congress simply does not possess.  Congress has substantial power to regulate 
interstate commerce, but it may not compel individuals to enter into such 
commerce so that Congress may better regulate them.  In the over 200 years that 
Congress has sat, it has never before attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause 
power in this manner.  That is not the product of remarkable restraint; Congress 
has not exercised such a power because it does not exist.  Instead, the Commerce 
Clause has always been understood as granting Congress authority ―to prescribe 
the rule by which commerce is to be governed,‖  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 
(1824), not to create or compel that commerce in the first instance.  Upholding 
Congress‘s novel assertion of authority to conscript individuals into commerce, or 
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indeed into any activity that substantially affects commerce, would eliminate any 
meaningful limit on Congress‘s enumerated powers and effectively destroy the 
Constitution‘s careful balance. 
The government makes no attempt to identify the outer limits of its newly 
found authority, but instead emphasizes that the health care market is unique.  
Uniqueness is hardly a source of legal authority, and neither the insurance market 
nor the broader health care market is unique.  Plenty of individuals rationally 
decide to self-insure, wholly apart from any disincentives created by federal law.  
And, in contrast to markets for basic necessities like food and shelter, it is not 
inevitable that every individual will ultimately participate in the health care 
market.  In any event, the government‘s argument that most individuals will 
someday participate in the health care market does not permit Congress to regulate 
all individuals now.   
The government similarly fails to differentiate the health care market from 
other markets by pointing to the potential for ―cost-shifting.‖  Cost-shifting is an 
inherent aspect of many markets in which the government chooses to subsidize 
costs.  Indeed, cost-shifting is so ubiquitous that the Supreme Court has already 
rejected as boundless the argument that Congress may justify legislation otherwise 
outside its Commerce Clause power on that basis.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 563–64 (1995).  Neither the health care market nor cost-shifting 
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concerns are unique; what is unique is the individual mandate‘s compulsion of 
commercial activity.   However, if this court upholds the ACA, this heretofore 
unexercised power will soon become ubiquitous. 
Nor is the individual mandate justified by resort to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  When a law‘s principal Commerce Clause defect is that it grants Congress 
a police power reserved to the States, pointing to the additional power conferred by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is a non sequitur.  A law that is not consistent 
with the ―letter and spirit‖ of the Constitution is not a ―proper‖ means of executing 
an enumerated power.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).  The 
individual mandate cannot be reconciled with the Constitution‘s structural 
protections or the Framers‘ conscious choice to give Congress only limited and 
enumerated powers.  The individual mandate cannot be justified as a modest 
provision incidental to the remainder of the ACA; instead, it is the very centerpiece 
of the Act.  It is also one of the Act‘s principal threats to individual liberty and the 
States‘ unique role in a true system of dual sovereignty. 
The mandate is equally indefensible as an exercise of Congress‘s taxing 
power, for the simple reason that the mandate is not a tax; it is a requirement that 
individuals engage in particular conduct.   
II. The ACA‘s dramatic expansion of States‘ obligations and liabilities 
under Medicaid is not a valid exercise of Congress‘s spending power.  Although 
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Congress may use the promise of federal funds to persuade a State to adopt federal 
conditions voluntarily, the Supreme Court has long ―recognized that in some 
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive 
as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Dole, 483 U.S. at 
211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590).  Unless that doctrine is to be 
abandoned, the ACA far surpasses that point.  The Act conditions all of the States‘ 
federal Medicaid funding — billions of dollars — upon acceptance of the ACA‘s 
expanded Medicaid eligibility and coverage provisions.  Accordingly, the only 
means by which a State may avoid the ACA‘s substantial new burdens is by 
withdrawing entirely from the Medicaid program, which is simply not possible 
given the amount of money at stake.  Congress itself recognized as much by 
providing no means other than Medicaid through which the neediest individuals 
might comply with the individual mandate. 
Rather than attempt to explain how the ACA complies with the coercion 
doctrine, the district court instead appears to have deemed coercion a political 
question not subject to meaningful judicial supervision.  However, the notion that 
coercion claims are nonjusticiable cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court‘s 
repeated recognition that the coercion doctrine does exist, or with the Court‘s 
adjudication on the merits of every coercion claim that has reached it.   
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III. As the district court correctly concluded, the ACA cannot survive the 
invalidation of its central individual mandate and the reforms directly tied to it.  
The government argues that some unidentifiable portion of the Act‘s 450 other 
provisions — provisions carefully calibrated to either fund or be funded by those 
central reforms — should nonetheless be left in place.  In doing so, the government 
ignores the central question in the severability analysis, namely, ―whether the 
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress‖ once the 
unconstitutional portions have been severed.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 685 (1987).  Without the individual mandate and its accompanying 
insurance reforms, the remnants of the ACA could not function in the manner 
Congress intended.   
Finally, the district court correctly included all Plaintiffs in its declaratory 
judgment.  The States have demonstrated standing to challenge the individual 
mandate in at least three respects: (1) they are injured by its requirement that 
millions more individuals enroll in Medicaid; (2) they are injured by the Act‘s 
other insurance reforms, from which the mandate cannot be severed; and (3) they 
are injured by the mandate‘s intrusion upon their sovereignty. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds Congress’s Authority To Regulate 
Interstate Commerce.  
Simply for being alive, an individual, by federal directive, must purchase 
qualifying health insurance, or to have it purchased by an employer on their behalf.  
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d), (f).  By attempting to compel people to participate 
in commerce, the individual mandate far exceeds the federal government‘s 
Commerce Clause authority to ―regulate commerce.‖  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(emphasis added).  Permitting Congress to force citizens to engage in commerce all 
the better to regulate them is simply not compatible with a system of enumerated 
and limited powers or a system of dual sovereignty.  Sanctioning such a power 
would eliminate all meaningful limits on Congress‘s authority and sound the death 
knell for our constitutional structure and individual liberties. 
A. The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not Include the Power 
To Compel Individuals To Engage in Commerce. 
1. The constitutional text and precedent are clear that the 
power to regulate commerce does not include the power to 
compel commerce. 
The Constitution grants Congress authority to ―regulate‖ interstate 
commerce.  Dating all the way back to Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly confirmed that, consistent with its plain meaning, ―the power to 
regulate‖ is the power ―to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed.‖  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).  Thus, commerce ―is 
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regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on [commercial] intercourse,‖ id. at 190 
— not by forcing anyone to carry on such intercourse in the first place.  Justice 
Field similarly explained that ―[t]he power to regulate [interstate] commerce … is 
the power to prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed, that is, the 
conditions upon which it shall be conducted.‖  Gloucester Ferry Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885); see also City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. 
Co., 149 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1893). 
Even as the challenges of economic modernization have caused the Supreme 
Court to expand the traditional meaning of ―interstate commerce,‖ see United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554–56 (1995), the Court has never questioned that 
the power to ―regulate‖ commerce is the power to prescribe rules to govern pre-
existing, voluntary conduct.  Indeed the very breadth of modern Commerce Clause 
doctrine is what makes so alarming the federal government‘s claim that if it may 
regulate conduct, it may also compel it.  There are now ―three general categories of 
regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power.‖  
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).  Congress may regulate (1) the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) ―activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.‖  Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.  In the third 
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category, Congress may regulate purely ―intrastate activity‖ that is ―economic in 
nature‖ and that, viewed in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
559–61; Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. 
Each of these categories presupposes a pre-existing voluntary activity to be 
regulated.  In particular, the third category — the one at issue in this case, see 
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 24–25 — requires that the congressional regulation be 
directed at commercial or economic ―activity.‖  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.  The 
government‘s own brief is replete with references to regulated ―activity‖ or 
―conduct‖ precisely because those terms are ubiquitous in the case law.  See, e.g., 
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29. 
Regulation of intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce is already at the edge of the Commerce Clause authority because it does 
not directly regulate interstate commerce itself.  Because broad regulation of such 
intrastate activities creates tension with our federalist system, the courts must resist 
―additional expansion‖ of that third category.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68; 
accord id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  That makes the ―activity‖ limitation 
crucial, because without it that third category would lose any claim to be grounded 
in the Constitution.  Congress would no longer be regulating interstate commerce 
or even activities that substantially affect interstate commerce ― instead, it would 
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be reaching out to compel private conduct where there had been no activity, and 
thus not effect interstate commerce. 
Moreover, Congress‘s ―plenary‖ regulatory authority over matters within the 
scope of its commerce power, see Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197, is strong evidence that 
Congress may not drag unwilling individuals within the scope of that power.  
Congress has ―direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject‖ of 
interstate commerce and therefore ―has power to pass laws for regulating the 
subjects specified, in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals 
[in] respect thereof.‖  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).  Indeed, Congress 
has ―full control‖ of ―the subjects committed to its regulation.‖  North Am. Co. v. 
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (quoting Minn. Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 
230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)).  If the Constitution gave Congress authority to draft 
individuals not just for military service, but for any activity directly affecting 
interstate commerce, and then to exercise full control over them, the Framers 
surely would have proposed far more protections in the Bill of Rights or rejected 
this dangerous new power altogether.  But they did neither, precisely because the 
commerce power was not some vortex of authority that rendered the entire process 
of enumeration beside the point.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (the commerce power ―seems to be an 
addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained‖). 
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2. Congress has never before attempted to use the Commerce 
Clause to compel private commercial activity.  
The absence of historical precedent for the exercise of such an extraordinary 
authority is revealing; if Congress actually possessed this power, it is doubtful that 
it would have taken two centuries to exercise it.  When ―earlier Congresses 
avoided use of‖ a ―highly attractive power,‖ that avoidance is ―reason to believe 
that the power was thought not to exist.‖  Printz, 521 U.S. at 905; see also Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743–44 (1999). 
Congress‘s own legal advisers have repeatedly confirmed that there is no 
historical precedent for this asserted power.  In 1994, the nonpartisan 
Congressional Budget Office observed that a ―mandate requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action.‖  
CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate To Buy Health 
Insurance 1 (1994) [hereinafter ―CBO Report‖].  The CBO explained that the 
federal government ―has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.‖  Id.  Rather, Congress has 
generally limited itself to imposing ―[f]ederal mandates‖ that ―apply to people as 
parties to economic transactions.‖  Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, during the debate over the current version of the individual 
mandate, the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service advised that ―[d]espite 
the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the Commerce Clause,‖ it is 
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―a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to 
purchase a good or service.‖  CRS, Requiring Individuals To Obtain Health 
Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (2009).  And while differing on the 
constitutional bottom line, courts have uniformly agreed that the individual 
mandate is unprecedented.  See Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 
2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 
882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at 
*18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
The absence of prior Commerce Clause legislation mandating private 
activity is not for lack of a motive; Congress previously declined to exercise that 
power even in situations where it obviously would have been expedient.  For 
example, when it became evident that ―relatively few individuals‖ were voluntarily 
purchasing flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. 
L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572, Congress made the purchase of flood insurance a 
prerequisite for participation in certain voluntary economic transactions.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 4012a(a) (no federal financial assistance for acquisition or construction of 
a building without flood insurance); id. § 4012a(b)(1) (federally regulated lenders 
may not make loans secured by property without flood insurance).  How much 
simpler to directly compel the purchase of such insurance; yet Congress never 
mandated the purchase of flood insurance by everyone in the flood plain. 
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The very same arguments the government is now making in defense of the 
individual mandate to purchase health insurance would have applied with equal 
force to a flood insurance mandate: Most individuals living in flood hazard areas 
will suffer flood-related losses at some point (participants in the flood-victim 
market in the government‘s locution), and those losses are likely to be distributed 
throughout society by mechanisms such as governmental disaster relief.  That 
Congress did not mandate the purchase of flood insurance by persons living in 
flood plains, despite the obvious practical benefits of doing so, strongly suggests 
that Congress thought it lacked that power. 
Similarly, a power to compel commerce would be particularly attractive 
during a recession, when congressional efforts to stimulate the economy are often 
frustrated by individuals‘ decisions to save rather than spend.  See Edmund L. 
Andrews, Economists See a Limited Boost from the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2009, at A1.  How much better for the long-run deficit and the short-term economy 
to mandate spending by individuals; yet Congress instead tinkered with different 
mechanisms for encouraging individuals voluntarily to spend more.  See Michael 
Cooper, From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard Of, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, 
at A1 (reporting that in light of ―evidence that people were more likely to save than 
spend the tax rebate checks they received,‖ Congress ―arranged for less money to 
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be withheld from people‘s paychecks‖).  Indeed, even during the Great Depression 
and two world wars, the government did not claim such a power.   
The government‘s effort to dig up counter-examples under the Commerce 
Clause only confirms that there are none: 
 The government cites the Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 
which required ―each and every free able-bodied white male citizen‖ 
between 18 and 45 years of age to ―be enrolled in the militia‖ and to 
obtain, ―within six months thereafter,‖ a firearm, ammunition, and other 
military equipment.  See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 44; see also Parker v. Dist. 
of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 386–87 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Congress enacted 
that requirement pursuant to its power to ―provide for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the militia,‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16, not its power 
to ―regulate commerce,‖ id. cl. 3.  Moreover, the arming requirement did 
not apply to every individual in the United States, only to those ―enrolled 
in the militia.‖ 
 
 The government points to the provision of the Emergency Banking Relief 
Act of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 2, authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to require all persons ―to pay and deliver to the Treasurer of the 
United States any or all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates‖ 
owned by them.  See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 44 (citing Nortz v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935)).  Congress passed that provision pursuant to 
its power ―to provide a currency for the whole country‖ and to ―put out of 
existence … a circulation in competition with notes issued by the 
government.‖  Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 543 (1871); see also 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.  See Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 294 
U.S. 240, 302–03 (1935). 
 
 The government cites the Endangered Species Act, the Federal Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act, and federal child pornography laws.  Govt.‘s 
Opening Br. 44.  Each of these federal statutes prohibits private conduct 
— taking a species, blocking a clinic, or possessing child pornography.  
None compels unwilling individuals to engage in commercial or 
economic activity. 
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If anything, the government‘s examples only confirm that ―[f]ederal 
mandates that apply to individuals as members of society are extremely rare,‖ CBO 
Report at 2, and non-existent under the Commerce Clause.  The ―numerousness‖ of 
federal statutes regulating voluntary commercial and economic activity, 
―contrasted with the utter lack of statutes‖ mandating such activity, is compelling 
evidence of the ―assumed absence of such power.‖  Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-08. 
B. The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not Authorize the 
Lifelong Regulation of Every Citizen on the Ground that Most 
Will, at Some Point, Engage in Commerce in the Future. 
Under correct legal principles, Congress‘s findings underlying the Act are 
plainly insufficient, and the government does not suggest otherwise.  Congress 
found that the mandate itself ―is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce.‖  ACA § 1501(a)(1).  That focus on 
regulatory impact, rather than pre-existing commercial activity only underscores 
the absence of constitutional authority under correct legal standards — instead of 
regulating activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce, Congress 
apparently considered it sufficient that the regulation itself would have such 
effects.  Requiring everyone to buy an airplane would certainly have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce, but that hardly brings such a mandate within 
Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority.  Congress also found that the ―decision‖ 
not to purchase a product, such as health insurance, is itself ―economic activity.‖  
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ACA § 1501(a)(2)(A).  But treating a mental process as the relevant ―activity‖ only 
underscores the absence of actual activity and the troubling lack of a limiting 
principle. 
Rather than defend those congressional findings, the government claims that 
the individual mandate is actually a regulation of future commercial or economic 
activity in which, the government presumes, most individuals subject to the 
mandate will ultimately engage.  This argument finds no support in precedent and 
has astonishing implications for federalism and individual liberty. 
1. It is not inevitable that everyone will purchase health 
insurance or consume health care services. 
The government‘s argument proceeds in three steps.  First, it identifies a 
broad national market for ―health care services.‖  Govt.‘s Opening Br. 26.  As 
defined, this market encompasses a wide variety of goods and services, including 
hospital care; physician and clinical services; other professional services (e.g., 
dentistry, chiropractic, mental health); prescription and over-the-counter drugs; and 
medical equipment such as eyeglasses and hearing aids.  See Centers For Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights, at 1 (2011), 
cited in Govt.‘s Opening Br. 7.  The size of this market in 2009 was $2.5 trillion, 
more than one-sixth of the nation‘s gross domestic product.  Id.  Second, the 
government claims that ―[v]irtually all‖ citizens participate in this broadly defined 
market.  Id. at 16; see also id. at 37–38.  Third, the government contends that 
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Congress may impose on all citizens a requirement to purchase health insurance as 
a means of ―regulat[ing]‖ the way those citizens ―pay for services in the interstate 
health care market.‖  Id. at 25–26. 
The government‘s theory boils down to the claim that if it can identify an 
―interstate market‖ in a broadly defined commodity, such as ―health care services,‖ 
that most individuals will need to consume at some point in their lives, it can then 
regulate everyone at every moment of their lives, from cradle to grave, as if they 
were at that very moment active participants in the interstate market in question.  
That is troubling and far too broad.  Just as ―depending on the level of generality, 
any activity can be looked upon as commercial,‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565, the 
government‘s theory shows that, depending on the level of generality, anyone, no 
matter how dormant, could be looked at (under the government‘s approach) as 
participating in a market. 
In the first place, as the government seemed to recognize below, the relevant 
market here is insurance, not health care.  The individual mandate does not force 
participation in the health care market or even mandate the use of insurance once 
purchased.  Instead, it forces people to pay now for health care that they may or 
may not receive at some point in the future.  But many people voluntarily decide to 
forego the purchase of health insurance, and many do so for reasons having 
nothing to do with the incentives created by other federal programs.   
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The government attempts to distinguish health insurance on the ground that 
everyone will participate in the health care market at some point.  But that is not 
strictly true, and does not render the market unique.  The government does not, and 
cannot, contend that all these individuals will necessarily participate in the health 
care market (much less that they will all fail to pay for any services).  Some will 
not participate due to religious scruples or individual circumstances. Indeed even 
the government concedes that participation in the health care market is not truly 
universal, as it feels the need to qualify its still-expansive claim that ―[v]irtually all 
Americans participate‖ in the health care market.  And participation in the health 
care market is not as truly universal as participation in the market for basic 
necessities, like food and clothing.  
Moreover, the government cites no statistics whatsoever that would show 
that all uninsured individuals that receive medical care do not pay for the care, 
even though that is the key economic problem the individual mandate is supposed 
to address.  The number of such persons is obviously significantly lower than the 
number of uninsured individuals who receive any medical care, since many healthy 
individuals make a rational choice to self-insure and are fully capable of paying for 
the care they receive.  According to the government‘s own statistics, uninsured 
persons pay 37% of their health care costs out of pocket, and third parties pay for 
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another 26% of those costs on their behalf.  See Families USA, Hidden Health Tax:  
Americans Pay a Premium, at 22, 6, cited in Gov‘t Opening Br. 10, 11. 
The government argues that ―Congress need not show that every uninsured 
person, or which uninsured persons, will receive uncompensated care,‖ but can 
instead consider the ―cumulative impact‖ of such care on interstate commerce.  
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 27.  This argument severely misunderstands the role of 
aggregation in Commerce Clause analysis.  Under Supreme Court precedent, 
consideration of the aggregate impact of an economic activity on interstate 
commerce allows congressional regulation to reach individual instances of that 
economic activity that do not, by themselves, have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 559–61.  But aggregation does not allow congressional regulation to reach 
individuals who are not engaged in that economic activity — much less individuals 
who never will be.  Thus, aggregation allows Congress to regulate a single 
farmer‘s apparently de minimus production of a nationally marketed commodity.  
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).  But it would not 
justify a law requiring others to produce or purchase that commodity. 
According to the government, the relevant economic activity is the ―practice 
of consuming health care services without insurance.‖  Govt.‘s Opening Br. 28.  At 
most, therefore, Supreme Court precedent allows Congress to regulate that activity 
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— for example, by imposing restrictions or penalties on individuals who attempt to 
consume health care services without insurance.  But that does not give Congress 
carte blanche to compel participation in that activity. 
Moreover, even if it were permissible (it is not) for Congress to adopt a false 
presumption that every individual will participate in the health care market at some 
point in time, Congress still would not have the power to force individuals into the 
market at other times.  An individual becomes subject to regulation only at the 
point at which the individual engages in a ―commercial transaction‖ or other 
―economic activity‖ in or substantially affecting interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 560–61.  The Court has never held commercial regulation justified based 
on a mere likelihood of economic activity at some unknown, perhaps distant, point 
in the future. 
2. Exercising regulatory authority over everyone on the theory 
that most people will eventually engage in an activity would 
impermissibly give Congress an unbounded police power. 
The government‘s novel theory — that Congress may exercise its plenary 
commerce power over all individuals at all times based on the likelihood that most 
citizens will participate in a broadly defined national market at some time — fails 
for the additional reason that it would vastly expand congressional power at the 
expense of States and our system of dual federalism.  The ―Constitution created a 
Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power 
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to the States.‖  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the ―scope of 
the interstate commerce power ‗must be considered in light of our dual system of 
government, and may not be extended so as to … obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.‘‖  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).  In particular, the Commerce Clause may not be 
read to grant the federal government ―a general police power.‖  Id. at 567; see also 
id. at 564.  
But that is precisely what the government‘s theory would do.  Every 
individual would be at all times subject to federal regulation of his or her private 
decisions related to health care or anything else that substantially affects interstate 
commerce (which it to say, almost everything).  There is no logical reason why 
such regulation would have to be limited to the decision whether to purchase health 
insurance.  Congress could regulate other decisions bearing on an individual‘s 
supposed ―active participation in the health care market,‖ such as whether to have 
an annual physical or to undertake certain courses of treatment.  The federal 
government‘s interest in controlling the cost of health care would likewise give 
Congress authority to order individuals to eat more vegetables and fewer desserts, 
to exercise at least 45 minutes per day, to sleep at least eight hours per day, and to 
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drink one glass of wine a day but never any beer.  Congress could rationally 
conclude that such mandates would control healthcare costs more directly, and 
perhaps more effectively, than ordering people to pay for services in a particular 
way. 
Even apart from health care, most citizens participate in a number of 
interstate markets at some point in their lives, including markets for housing, food, 
clothing, education, and transportation.  Indeed, the need for food and clothing is at 
least as pressing and ubiquitous as health care.  By the government‘s logic, 
Congress could legislate as if all citizens were participants in those interstate 
markets at all times, and tell them what type of housing, food, and clothing to 
consume, and how to pay for them.  Cf. R.E. 2048 (noting that government 
counsel, when questioned, did not foreclose the possibility that Congress could 
require people to buy cars).   
This is precisely the sort of limitless reading of the Commerce Clause that 
the Supreme Court has foreclosed.  So long as the commerce power is ―subject to 
outer limits,‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, it cannot be invoked to justify the imposition 
of a cradle-to-grave regulatory regime on all or nearly all individuals in the United 
States. 
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3. “Cost-shifting” is neither unique to the health care context 
nor a basis for departing from fundamental constitutional 
precepts.  
The government suggests that ―cost-shifting‖ is a ―unique‖ feature that 
distinguishes the health care services market from other markets and justifies the 
especially intrusive regulation represented by the individual mandate.  See Govt.‘s 
Opening Br. 34–37.  But uniqueness is not a talisman that justifies the 
government‘s use of unconstitutional means; if anything, the government‘s 
repeated emphasis on purported uniqueness only underscores its lack of a viable 
legal theory.  And as noted above, the only thing that is really unique here is 
Congress‘s unprecedented attempt to use its authority to regulate commerce as a 
basis for conscripting people into participating in commerce. 
Cost-shifting is certainly not unique to this context.  It is an inherent aspect 
of many markets due to the frequent availability of ―‗backstops‘ provided by law, 
including bankruptcy protection and other government-funded financial assistance 
and services.‖  R.E. 2055; see also R.E. 2049.  On the same rationale, therefore, 
the government could require everyone to adopt arguably prudent practices to 
protect their financial status, as well as that of their dependents, by, for example:  
maintaining minimum levels of life insurance; avoiding risky investments; and not 
incurring more than a certain amount of debt.  Similarly, because the eventual need 
for burial or cremation services is at least as likely as the need for health care, the 
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government would evidently assert authority to require everyone to pre-pay for a 
coffin or urn, to avoid shifting costs onto the public. 
The Supreme Court rejected a similar cost-shifting and insurance rationale in 
Lopez and Morrison.  In Lopez, the government argued that Congress could 
regulate violent crime under the commerce power because ―the costs of violent 
crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are 
spread throughout the population.‖  514 U.S. at 563–64.  The Court reasoned that 
under this cost-shifting and insurance rationale, ―Congress could regulate not only 
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of 
how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.‖  Id. at 564.  Morrison similarly 
rejected the government‘s argument that gender-motivated violence affects 
interstate commerce by, among other things, ―increasing medical and other costs.‖  
529 U.S. at 615. 
The cost-shifting and insurance rationale is even weaker here insofar as the 
government would apply it to almost all Americans solely for being alive, not only 
to people who engage in specific targeted activities.  And unlike violent crime, the 
cost-shifting problem is also of Congress‘s making — Congress made the decision 
to guarantee free healthcare to uninsured individuals through the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  It is 
absurd for the government to argue that Congress‘s decision to make healthcare 
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available for free gives it authority to force everyone to pre-pay for that service 
(regardless of whether they ever use or want it).1 
For that reason, the Government‘s repeated citation of Justice Kennedy‘s 
Lopez concurrence for the proposition that ―principles of economic practicality‖ 
govern is at best ironic.  Gov‘t Br. 43.  The practicality here is that ―[t]he statute 
before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional 
assertion of the commerce power.‖  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
C. The Individual Mandate Is Not a Necessary and Proper Means of 
Executing the Commerce Power. 
The government nonetheless argues that the individual mandate is justified 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But even that ―last, best hope of those 
who defend ultra vires congressional action,‖ Printz, 521 U.S. at 923, cannot be 
stretched so far. 
                                       
1 The government tries to portray Congress as having bowed to a ―societal 
judgment‖ that uninsured individuals should be guaranteed free medical care, 
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 36, apparently in an effort to soften the blow of its implication 
that Congress can expand its own authority over individuals by offering them 
gratuitous benefits and then demanding pre-payment.  There is, however, no 
indication that Congress‘s decision to offer free medical care was based on a 
stronger ―societal judgment‖ than that which underlies any other democratically 
enacted legislation.  And if anything distinguishes the judgment reflected by 
EMTALA, it is that it implicates issues squarely within the reserved power of the 
States.  
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As the Supreme Court has long held, a law that is inconsistent with the 
―letter and spirit‖ of the Constitution is not a ―proper‖ means of executing an 
enumerated power.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.  The Court has also made clear 
that when a law violates fundamental constitutional principles, ―it is not a 
‗La[w] … proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,‘ and is thus, 
in the words of the Federalist, ‗merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation‘ which ‗deserve[s] 
to be treated as such.‘‖  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 733–34 (same).  One such principle, which is 
―deeply ingrained in our constitutional history,‖ is that the ―Constitution created a 
Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power 
to the States.‖  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 155) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  These ―precepts of federalism embodied in the 
Constitution inform which powers are properly exercised by the National 
Government‖ under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
As explained above, the individual mandate would violate the fundamental 
constitutional principle that the federal government is one ―of limited powers.‖  
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8.  It is far from ―Proper‖ to eviscerate that basic 
constitutional precept.   
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Moreover, the mandate is not ―incidental‖ (McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411) to 
some other legitimate regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Congress sought to 
―increase the number and share of Americans who are insured,‖ ACA 
§ 1501(a)(2)(C), and it did so by the most direct route available:  requiring them to 
be insured.  Thus, this is not a means to some legitimate end, but an end in itself.  
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress may not invoke the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to exercise any ―great substantive and independent power,‖ only 
powers that are ―incidental to those powers which are expressly given‖ and that 
―subserve the legitimate objects of‖ the federal government.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 411.  But the power exercised here is distinct from any Commerce Clause power 
ever exercised and could not have been granted without prompting 
contemporaneous objection.  The fundamental problem is that Congress has 
invoked a power that it was not granted under the Commerce Clause, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause or anywhere else.    
The government also contends that the individual mandate is incidental to 
―the requirement that insurers extend coverage and set premiums without regard to 
pre-existing medical conditions.‖  Govt.‘s Opening Br. 28.  The government insists 
that this requirement ―would not work without‖ the individual mandate because the 
requirement will encourage consumers to refrain from buying insurance until they 
are injured or sick.  Id. at 30–31; see ACA § 1501(a)(2)(G).  But on this reasoning, 
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the individual mandate is designed not to ―subserve‖ and facilitate the Act‘s 
insurance industry reforms, McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411, but to counteract their 
anticipated negative consequences. 
As the district court correctly recognized, the government‘s reasoning would 
mean that ―the more harm [a] statute does, the more power Congress could assume 
for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖  R.E. 2061.  The Constitution 
does not permit this type of blatant bootstrapping ― create a problem and then 
assert that it is necessary and proper to fix the problem by asserting an authority 
the Constitution otherwise denies the federal government.  Moreover, the 
individual mandate is the centerpiece of the Act, as the government has repeatedly 
stressed, not a collateral provision or distinct means to some other end.  As 
discussed below, the government‘s arguments about the necessity of the individual 
mandate to the ACA‘s other provisions show that the Act is not severable; but they 
hardly increase Congress‘s authority to enact those measures in the first place.   
The multi-factor inquiry used by the Supreme Court in its most recent 
exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that the individual 
mandate is not necessary and proper.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1949.  Comstock 
upheld a civil-commitment statute for prisoners with certain mental health issues 
after considering four contextual factors, none of which supports invocation of that 
Clause here. 
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While there was a ―long history of federal involvement‖ in prison-related 
mental health statutes, id., there is no history of the federal government mandating 
the purchase of health insurance (or any other commodity).  Similarly, the 
individual mandate is not ―reasonably adapted‖ to Congress‘s ―responsibilities.‖  
Id. at 1961–62.  Unlike Comstock, where the common law imposed obligations on 
the government as custodian, the federal government has no legal duty to 
undertake the unprecedented step of providing or mandating health care to 
everyone legally in the country. 
Nor does the individual mandate have only a ―narrow‖ scope.  Id. at 1949, 
1364-65; cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (―the question of congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause is ‗necessarily one of degree‘‖) (citation omitted).  It applies 
to almost everyone legally living in the United States, solely because they live in 
the United States.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d). 
The individual mandate certainly does not ―accommodat[e] state interests‖ 
by leaving them any choice in the matter, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962; instead, it 
overrides state interests in favor of a one-size-fits-all federal mandate, even in 
those States like Idaho, Utah, and Virginia that have enacted laws expressly 
guaranteeing their citizens the freedom to choose not to purchase health insurance.  
See Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9003; Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2505.5; Va. Code. 
Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1. 
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The manner in which the individual mandate runs roughshod over state 
interests is particularly egregious given that protection of the public health lies at 
the core of the States‘ traditional police power.  See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex 
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in 
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963).  The lack of any limiting principle on this 
power and the reality that it amounts to a federal police power vitiates any reliance 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (―Nor need 
we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general ‗police power, which 
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.‘‖ (quoting 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).  When, as here, the fundamental problem with the 
federal government‘s Commerce Clause theory is the lack of a limiting principle, 
its resort to the Necessary and Proper Clause to augment that power, and make it 
more like a federal police power is a non-sequitur.  Unlike Comstock, or any other 
case on which the government relies,2 this is a case in which ―the National 
Government relieves the States of their own primary responsibility to enact laws 
and policies for the safety and well being of their citizens‖ and ―the exercise of 
                                       
2  This suffices to distinguish not only Comstock but precedents of this Court that 
rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to effectuate a 
government policy that depends on a more customary exercise of the Commerce 
power.  But when the problem is that the Commerce Clause power asserted has no 
limits, pointing to additional authorities that augment the Commerce Clause is non-
responsive.   
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national power intrudes upon functions and duties traditionally committed to the 
State.‖  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
D. The Individual Mandate Is Not a Valid Exercise of Congress’s 
Taxing Power. 
The government briefly argues that even if the individual mandate is not a 
valid exercise of Congress‘s commerce power, it is nonetheless a valid exercise of 
Congress‘s power to ―lay and collect Taxes.‖  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see 
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 50–54.  Like every other court to consider the issue, the 
district court correctly rejected the government‘s argument.  See Mead, 2011 WL 
611139, at *22–*23; Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010, at *10–*12 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011); 
Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88; Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-
00015, 2010 WL 4860299, at *9–*11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); U.S. Citizens 
Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10 CV 1065, 2010 WL 4947043, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 
22, 2010); Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 890–91. 
Whether the statutory penalty for not complying with the individual mandate 
is a tax is ultimately irrelevant because Plaintiffs are challenging the mandate 
itself, which is clearly not a tax.  The ACA mandates that nearly every individual 
in the United States ―shall … ensure that the individual … is covered under 
minimum essential coverage‖ as defined by federal law.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) 
(emphasis added).  Congress then imposed a ―penalty‖ on any individual who 
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―fails to meet the requirement‖ of that individual mandate.  § 5000A(b)(1).  
Plaintiffs‘ main constitutional challenge is to the mandate itself, which makes it 
unlawful not to secure qualifying health insurance coverage; the ―penalty‖ for 
failure to comply is invalid simply as a consequence of the mandate‘s invalidity.  
See R.E. 387 n.3 (acknowledging that plaintiffs‘ ―challenge ‗is to the mandate 
itself‘ and not the ‗incidental penalty that accompanies the individual mandate‘‖). 
The cases cited by the Government are beside the point because they do not 
involve the constitutionality of a regulatory prohibition or requirement, as opposed 
to a tax.  For example, United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950), involved 
a tax on transferring a drug where the ―transfer is not made an unlawful act under 
the statute‖ (emphasis added); instead of mandating or prohibiting any activity, 
Congress simply taxed it.  Similarly, in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 
513 (1937), the Court emphasized that ―[t]he case is not one where the statute 
contains regulatory provisions related to a purported tax in such a way as has 
enabled this Court to say in other cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a 
means of enforcing the regulations.‖  It would be unprecedented to uphold as a 
valid exercise of the taxing power an act of Congress that on its face purports to 
impose a direct regulatory mandate on individual conduct.  
The distinction is not a mere formality; there are important differences 
between a regulation directly mandating certain conduct and a tax encouraging that 
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conduct.  Most obviously, when Congress provides incentives through the tax 
code, the choice whether to take advantage of those incentives remains with each 
individual; but when Congress expressly mandates an action, law-abiding 
individuals must comply.  Tax and regulatory legislation are also treated 
differently under the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (―All bills for 
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives ….‖).  Finally, 
whether a measure is structured as a tax or a regulation has tangible consequences 
in terms of public perception and political accountability, as the district court 
observed.  R.E. 405. 
Even if the classification of the penalty as a regulatory penalty or a tax 
mattered, the district court correctly concluded that the structure and legislative 
history of the ACA demonstrate that Congress made a deliberate choice to treat the 
financial exaction in ACA § 1501(b) (§ 5000A(b)) as a regulatory penalty rather 
than a tax.  Among other things, Congress: 
(i) specifically changed the term in previous incarnations of the 
statute from ―tax‖ to ―penalty‖; 
(ii) used the term ―tax‖ in describing several other exactions 
provided for in the Act [but not the individual mandate]; 
(iii) specifically relied on and identified its Commerce Clause 
power and not its taxing power; 
(iv) eliminated traditional IRS enforcement methods for the 
failure to pay the ―tax‖; and 
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(v) failed to identify in the legislation any revenue that would 
be raised from it, notwithstanding that at least seventeen other 
revenue-generating provisions were specifically so identified. 
R.E. 390–400; see also Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88. 
Finally, the legislation would still be unconstitutional even if Congress had 
not imposed a direct regulatory mandate and even if it had not chosen to treat the 
penalty as a penalty rather than a tax.  The taxing power is broad, but not so broad 
as to eliminate constitutional limits on Congress‘s regulatory authority.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that ―the taxing power may not be used as the 
instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to which 
the Congress has no authority to interfere.‖  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70 
(1936). 
While the Supreme Court has cut back on some of the limits it used to 
impose on the taxing power, it has never abandoned, and instead has reaffirmed, 
the principle that ―there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of 
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty 
with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.‖  Dep’t of Rev. of Montana 
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 
292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)).3  The Supreme Court certainly would not have upheld the 
                                       
3 The Supreme Court‘s statement in a footnote in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 
416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) that it had ―abandoned‖ ―distinctions between 
regulatory and revenue-raising taxes‖ such as those drawn in Hill v. Wallace was 
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federal intrusions into traditional State domains at issue in Lopez and Morrison if 
Congress had simply imposed a ―tax penalty‖ for gender-motivated violence or 
possession of a gun in a school zone.  This Court need not reach that question, 
however, because Congress expressly imposed a direct regulatory mandate, instead 
of imposing only a tax on lawful conduct. 
II. The ACA’s Dramatic Expansion of the Medicaid Program Is Not a 
Valid Exercise of Congress’s Spending Power. 
The government does not argue that the Commerce Clause or the taxing 
authority supports the ACA‘s dramatic expansion of the States‘ Medicaid burdens.  
Nor does it deny that the expansion would ordinarily violate the Tenth 
Amendment‘s prohibition against commandeering state governments.  Instead, the 
government resorts to the Spending Clause, arguing that the expansions are 
constitutional conditions on the States‘ acceptance of federal funding. 
Congress may not, however, employ its spending power to coerce States into 
capitulating to federal demands.  See Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590; Dole, 483 
U.S. at 211.  The Supreme Court has thus ―recognized that in some circumstances 
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Dole, 482 U.S. at 211 (quoting 
Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590).  By conditioning all of the States‘ billions of 
                                                                                                                           
dictum that has been superseded by Kurth Ranch‘s recognition of the continued 
viability of such distinctions. 
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dollars of federal Medicaid funding on their adoption of the ACA‘s expanded 
eligibility and coverage terms, Congress has plainly passed that point.  No State 
could afford to turn down all of its Medicaid money, which accounts for 40% of all 
federal grant money, and there is no reasonable relationship between the changes 
Congress seeks to impose and the withholding of all Medicaid funds.  Congress 
itself was so sure the States could not decline to continue participating in Medicaid 
that it provided no other way for the neediest individuals to comply with the 
individual mandate. 
A. The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Reiterated that Spending 
Power Conditions Must Be Truly Voluntary. 
―No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.‖  New 
York, 505 U.S. at 178; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  Thus, although the 
Supreme Court has ―identified a variety of methods … by which Congress may 
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests,‖ 
Congress may not resort to ―outright coercion‖ to achieve that result.  New York, 
505 U.S. at 166. 
To ensure that Congress may not use its spending power to circumvent that 
limitation, the Supreme Court has admonished that when Congress conditions 
acceptance of Federal funds upon adoption of a federal regulatory program, the 
legitimacy of Congress‘s action ―rests on whether the State voluntarily and 
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knowingly accepts the terms‖ Congress has attached to the funds.  Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (emphasis added).  Though a 
spending power condition is always in some superficial sense ―voluntary‖ — 
Congress does not legally obligate States to accept federal funding — the Court 
has made clear that a State‘s adoption of a federal regulation in exchange for 
federal funding must be voluntary ―not merely in theory but in fact.‖  Dole, 483 
U.S. at 211-12. 
To that end, the Court has ―recognized that in some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point 
at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Id. at 211 (citing Steward Machine, 
301 U.S. at 590); accord Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999).  Although the Court has acknowledged the 
difficulty inherent in determining ―the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590, it has never abandoned the 
enterprise.  See id. at 591 (―We do not fix the outermost line.  Enough for present 
purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.‖); Dole, 483 U.S. 
at 211 (reaffirming coercion doctrine‘s existence before rejecting coercion claim 
on the merits); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (similar).  If the 
coercion here does not cross the line, then the Court was simply mistaken to 
identify any constitutional limit at all.   
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The contours of the coercion doctrine are best illustrated by the Fourth 
Circuit‘s en banc plurality opinion in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley.  
There, the Federal government withheld all of a $60 million grant under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after Virginia refused to 
provide services to a small number of individuals.  See 106 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 
1997).  Although the court held that any requirement that those individuals be 
provided with services was not unambiguously set forth in the statute as required 
by Dole, id. at 567–68, a six-judge plurality went on to explain that there was also 
a ―substantial‖ question whether the government‘s actions rendered Congress‘s 
exercise of its spending power impermissibly coercive, id. at 569. 
Judge Luttig‘s plurality opinion rejected the suggestion that courts are 
incapable of determining when the sheer enormity of a federal inducement makes 
it coercive, noting that ―[t]he difference between a $1000 grant and, as here, a $60 
million grant, insofar as their coercive potential is concerned, is self-evident.‖  Id. 
at 570.  The plurality also pointed out that, ―in stark contrast‖ to Dole, where South 
Dakota stood to lose only 5% of its funding if it rejected the condition in question 
(the critical factor in the Supreme Court‘s analysis, see Dole, 483 U.S. at 211), the 
Federal government withheld all of Virginia‘s IDEA funding, even though 
Virginia‘s refusal to comply with the condition in question only affected a very 
small portion of students ―for whom the special education funds were earmarked.‖  
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Riley, 106 F.3d at 569.  ―This is a condition considerably more pernicious than the 
‗relatively mild encouragement‘ at issue in Dole.‖  Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 
211). 
Since Riley, the Fourth Circuit has reiterated its view that ―serious Tenth 
Amendment questions would be raised‖ if Congress disproportionately conditioned 
the entirety of a large federal grant upon a State‘s adoption of limited revisions to a 
much broader program.  West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
289 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting coercion claim based on finding that 
government had not withheld or threatened to withhold State‘s entire Medicaid 
grant); see also Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting) (four-judge dissent concluding that Congress 
exceeded its Spending Clause powers because ―the proportion of federal funds for 
education in Arkansas here placed at risk by the federal scheme (100%), the 
amount of those funds (some $250,000,000), and the difficulty of making up for 
the loss of those funds if the State elects not to [accept the condition] all lead to the 
conclusion that pressure has turned into compulsion‖). 
Following in the footsteps of Dole, these decisions correctly recognize that 
the coercion doctrine focuses on both the size of the federal inducement and the 
relationship between the condition and the inducement.  The more massive the 
amount of federal funding that Congress threatens to withhold, the greater the need 
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for Congress to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the conditions and 
the funds, lest Congress simply manipulate its power of the purse to coerce States 
into capitulating to federal demands.   
B. Congress’s Conditioning of Billions of Dollars in Medicaid 
Funding on States’ Acceptance of the ACA’s Expansion of 
Medicaid Is Impermissibly Coercive. 
Whether Congress employed impermissible coercion in the ACA is not a 
close question; under any meaningful analysis, it did.  The ACA seeks to 
significantly expand Medicaid eligibility and coverage.  See pp. 6-8, supra.  Yet 
rather than simply hold out the promise of additional funding should States agree 
to these expansions, Congress has threatened to withhold all Medicaid funding — 
literally billions of dollars for most States — if States do not accept Congress‘s 
terms.  That is unquestionably coercive, as States quite literally cannot afford to 
sacrifice billions in federal funds raised from the State‘s own residents, and 
therefore have no real choice as to whether to accept these new conditions.   
Medicaid is the single largest federal grant-in-aid program, accounting for a 
staggering 40% of all federal funds paid to States and approximately 7% of all 
federal spending.  In 2008, the average State received well over $1 billion in 
Medicaid funding; even the lowest recipient (Wyoming) received $246 million.  
Cf. Riley, 106 F.3d at 570 (plurality opinion) (noting that ―the coercive potential‖ 
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of a $60 million grant ―is self-evident‖).4  States spend, on average, 20% of their 
budgets on Medicaid expenditures, and federal funds cover at least half (oftentimes 
more) of each State‘s costs.  R.E. 1555.  Florida, for example, currently devotes 
26% of its entire state budget to Medicaid; if Florida lost federal funding, it would 
have to devote more than 60% of all state tax revenues to Medicaid in order to 
maintain existing, pre-ACA benefits.  R.E. 493.  Given the scale of that impact, 
States have no meaningful choice between doubling the percentage of state tax 
revenues dedicated to medical coverage and complying with additional strings 
attached to those pre-existing federal funds.  The federal funds are themselves 
supplied by taxpayers in the State, so a State cannot simply take on the 
responsibility and increase State tax revenues accordingly.  Although the precise 
impact of Medicaid funding differs from State to State, one thing is clear:  the loss 
of all Medicaid funding would be devastating to any State.  The federal 
government does not – and could not – deny this basic reality. 
Yet that is precisely what the ACA threatens.  The only discernable 
relationship between the size of the federal inducement and the conditions the 
ACA imposes is that the former leaves the States with no choice but to accept the 
latter.  That is not a reasonable relationship; it is unadorned coercion. 
                                       
4 State-by-State Medicaid data was most recently published in 2008, when federal 
spending totaled $192 billion.  R.E. 1551–55.  Federal Medicaid spending 
increased by more than 30% (to $251 billion) in 2009 and is predicted to increase 
by another $434 billion before the decade is over.  R.E. 1425.  
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That coercive effect was clear to Congress.  The ACA‘s otherwise 
comprehensive scheme for universal health insurance provides no means other 
than Medicaid through which the Nation‘s neediest residents might comply with 
the mandate to maintain minimum health insurance coverage.  See ACA 
§ 5000A(f)(1)(A).  By predicating the individual mandate and its coverage of the 
poorest citizens on the States‘ inability to withdraw from Medicaid, Congress 
recognized that States could not realistically turn down the massive federal funds 
at stake. 
The constitutional violation is further illustrated by the fact that the ACA 
does not simply (or even primarily) impose conditions on how the States spend 
federal funds.  The Act instead compels States to adopt, enforce, and even help 
fund a comprehensive federal regulatory program — something Congress could 
not otherwise do without running afoul of the Tenth Amendment commandeering 
doctrine, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  To be sure, Congress can and often does use 
its spending power to attempt to persuade States to adopt federal regulatory 
programs.  But when Congress pools massive amounts of federal resources into a 
single lump sum that it threatens to withhold absent State capitulation, its actions 
can no longer be characterized as simple persuasion, but instead constitute 
―forbidden regulation in the guise of Spending Clause condition[s].‖  Riley, 106 
F.3d at 569.   
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C. Neither the District Court Nor the Government Provided Any 
Meaningful Response to the Merits of the States’ Coercion Claim. 
In denying the government‘s motion to dismiss the States‘ coercion claim, 
the district court recognized that, ―[i]f the Supreme Court meant what it said in 
Dole and Steward Machine Co. (and I must presume that it did), there is a line 
somewhere between mere pressure and impermissible coercion.‖  R.E. 434.  The 
court further recognized that, as shown by the facts detailed above, the States ―are 
in an extremely difficult situation,‖ and the presence of coercion ―can perhaps be 
inferred by the fact that Congress does not really anticipate that the states will (or 
could) drop out of the Medicaid program.‖  Id.  At the summary judgment stage, 
however, the district court appeared to hold that the Supreme Court did not mean 
what it said, and that coercion is not a valid legal theory.  R.E. 2011.  In doing so, 
the court erroneously relied on a line of decisions from other circuits that largely 
pre-dates and conflicts with the Supreme Court‘s most recent pronouncements on 
the subject in Dole and other cases.  R.E. 2011–13. 
Before Dole, two circuits rejected the coercion doctrine after mistakenly 
reading Steward Machine to foreclose any argument that the sheer enormity of a 
federal inducement can render spending legislation coercive.  See Oklahoma v. 
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981); N.H. Dep’t of Employment Sec. v. 
Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1980).  As noted above, and as the district 
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court appeared to acknowledge, the Supreme Court subsequently corrected that 
misreading of Steward Machine in Dole.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
Nonetheless, three other circuits have since relied upon the reasoning of the 
earlier court of appeals‘ decisions to foreclose coercion claims.  See Kansas v. 
United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 
593, 599 (8th Cir. 2003); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989).  
The district court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Skinner, in 
which Judge Reinhardt suggested, in obiter dictum, that coercion claims are 
nonjusticiable.  In support of that suggestion, the Ninth Circuit first relied upon 
Schweiker‘s pre-Dole analysis, and then posited that the Supreme Court had 
implicitly deemed coercion claims nonjusticiable in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which addressed the Tenth 
Amendment commandeering doctrine, not the Spending Clause.  Citing Garcia, 
the Ninth Circuit theorized:  ―The purpose of the coercion test is to protect state 
sovereignty from federal incursions.  If this sovereignty is adequately protected by 
the national political process [according to Garcia], we do not see any reason for 
asking the judiciary to settle questions of policy and politics that range beyond its 
normal expertise.‖  Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448. 
The Ninth Circuit‘s analysis is doubly flawed.  First, the Supreme Court 
decided Dole two years after it decided Garcia.  Second, to the extent Garcia 
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suggested State sovereignty claims are categorically nonjusticiable, the Court 
subsequently rejected that view in New York and Printz, both of which struck down 
duly enacted federal statutes as unconstitutional federal incursions on State 
sovereignty.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 177; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  
Accordingly, Skinner and the other decisions that followed it are inconsistent with 
no fewer than three Supreme Court cases and provide no persuasive basis for 
viewing coercion claims with suspicion.  Unless and until the Supreme Court 
abandons the coercion doctrine, courts are bound to apply it, and the district court 
erred by failing to do so. 
Nor has there ever been a stronger coercion claim than the one here, as 
confirmed by the fact that all of the decisions that have rejected coercion claims on 
their merits are readily distinguishable.  Dole, for example, rejected a coercion 
claim because Congress‘s attachment of a condition to 5% of federal highway 
funds ($4 million) constituted only ―relatively mild encouragement.‖  Dole, 483 
U.S. at 211.  In West Virginia, the State failed to substantiate its allegation that the 
federal government ―withh[e]ld (or threaten[ed] to withhold) the entirety‖ of its 
Medicaid funding.  289 F.3d at 292.  And in Steward Machine, the State ―d[id] not 
offer a suggestion that  … she was affected by duress.‖  301 U.S. at 589.  
In rejecting the States‘ claim, the district court invoked purported ―judicial 
findings‖ that Medicaid is a voluntary program.  R.E. 2010.  But the cases the court 
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cited only observed that States are under no legal obligation to participate in 
Medicaid; they did not address whether Congress had coerced their participation.  
See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990); Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. 
Facilities v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1211 
(11th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998).  Even if they 
had, those decisions would have little bearing on this case.  The States‘ claim is 
that the ACA is impermissibly coercive because it conditions receipt of all 
Medicaid funds on the ACA‘s expansions of Medicaid.  The validity of that claim 
can hardly be determined by reference to decisions that pre-date the ACA and its 
expansions by more than a decade. 
Finally, the district court stated that there is a ―factual dispute‖ about ACA‘s 
financial impact on the States that ―cannot be resolved on summary judgment.‖  
R.E. 2009.  If there were a material dispute of fact on the application of the 
coercion doctrine, that would only underscore the district court‘s legal error in 
holding that coercion claims are per se invalid.5 
                                       
5 The district court stated that two States ―acknowledged … that they can withdraw 
from [Medicaid].‖  R.E. 2010.  Those States acknowledged only that the ACA has 
not eliminated the theoretical possibility of withdrawal; both made clear that 
withdrawal is not an actual option.  See R.E. 794 ¶16 (―Though theoretically 
possible, South Dakota cannot cease participation in the Medicaid Program.‖); 
R.E. 710 ¶2 (noting that ―Nevada can still consider opting out of Medicaid‖ but 
withdrawal would be unaffordable). 
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Ironically, however, the government‘s arguments help underscore the extent 
of the coercion.  The government has argued, for example, that it will offer 
additional funding to States that capitulate to its demands.  That renders the ACA 
more coercive, not less, as it increases the amount of funds States would forfeit — 
funds obtained largely through federal taxes on States‘ residents — were they to 
reject Congress‘s demands.  Whatever ―the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590, the ACA has far surpassed it.  
III. The District Court Ordered Appropriate Relief. 
A. The Individual Mandate and Medicaid Reforms May Not Be 
Severed from the ACA.   
The district court correctly held that the unconstitutional individual mandate 
is not severable from the rest of the ACA, and that the entire ACA must be 
invalidated.  R.E. 2075.  The same is true of the coercive Medicaid amendments 
for essentially the same reasons.6  Thus, the unconstitutionality of either of those 
provisions is fatal to the entire ACA. 
The government argues that the district court departed from settled legal 
standards by striking down the ACA in its entirety even though many of its 
provisions could operate in isolation, without the individual mandate.  But the 
                                       
6 The States also continue to maintain that the employer mandate and health 
exchange benefit provisions violate the Tenth Amendment.  Although the district 
court dismissed those claims as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, R.E. 424–
25, the States reserve their right to challenge the Supreme Court‘s decisions in 
Garcia and Hodel before the Supreme Court. 
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―well established‖ severability doctrine does not turn on whether Congress could 
have passed the remainder of the same act without the unconstitutional provision; 
it instead asks whether Congress would have done so.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).   
Thus, whether constitutional provisions are capable of functioning without 
an unconstitutional one is not the only — or even primary — factor in the 
severance analysis.  ―The more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is 
whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.‖  Id. at 685.  When ―it is evident that the legislature would not have 
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is 
not,‖ the provisions may not be severed.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) 
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) 
(employing severance when ―nothing in the statute‘s text or historical context 
makes it ‗evident‘ that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, would have preferred no [act] at all to‖ severance of the 
unconstitutional provision) (citation omitted). 
1. The core health care reforms are not severable.   
The district court correctly concluded that ―it is reasonably ‗evident‘ … that 
the individual mandate was an essential and indispensable part of the health reform 
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efforts, and that Congress did not believe other parts of the Act could (or it would 
want them to) survive independently.‖  R.E. 2075.  The ACA consists of five 
central components.  See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 13–15.  In addition to the individual 
mandate, the Act: (1) mandates the creation of health benefit exchanges to help 
individuals and small businesses pool their purchasing power to obtain lower cost 
insurance; (2) establishes employer mandates, penalties and incentives to expand 
the availability of employer-sponsored insurance; (3) expands Medicaid eligibility 
and coverage and offers tax credits to create affordable insurance options for those 
with incomes up to 400% of the poverty level; and (4) bars insurers from denying, 
canceling, capping, or increasing the cost of coverage based on an individual‘s pre-
existing conditions or coverage history. 
As the government itself has emphasized, Congress intended each of these 
core components, including the Medicaid expansion, to ―work[] in tandem‖ with 
the individual mandate to make insurance more available and affordable.  
R.E. 141.  Indeed, when arguing that the individual mandate is constitutional, the 
government has repeatedly asserted that ―Congress … concluded that the minimum 
coverage provision is necessary to make the other regulations in the Act effective.‖  
R.E. 143 (emphasis added); see also R.E. 999 (―the minimum coverage provision 
forms an integral part of the ACA‘s larger reforms of health insurance industry 
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practices‖).7  As the district court observed, the government referred to the 
mandate ―as an ‗essential‘ part of the Act at least fourteen times in their motion to 
dismiss.‖  R.E. 2065.  Thus, the government is in no position to assert that the 
mandate is severable.   
The government‘s concessions were unavoidable because Congress plainly 
intended the individual mandate to render the Act‘s insurance reforms more 
affordable for the federal government, the States, and the insurance industry.  As 
Congress found, ―[b]y significantly increasing health insurance coverage and the 
size of purchasing pools, which will increase economies of scale, the [mandate], 
together with the other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce 
administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums.‖  ACA 
§ 1501(a)(2)(H).  That makes the individual mandate the ―lynchpin of the entire 
health reform effort.‖  R.E. 2068. 
Conversely, the other reforms, including the Medicaid expansion, are 
necessary to make insurance available to individuals covered by the mandate.  As 
the government has explained, many individuals covered by the mandate ―are 
unable to obtain [insurance] without the insurance market reforms, tax credits, 
cost-sharing, and Medicaid eligibility expansion that the Act will provide.‖  R.E. 
                                       
7 To be clear, the States by no means concede that the Act‘s five core provisions 
achieve that or any other goal Congress set forth.  But the relevant question in the 
severance analysis is how Congress intended the Act to function.  See Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006).   
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984–85.  Indeed, expanded Medicaid coverage is especially essential to the 
viability of the individual mandate, because under the ACA, Medicaid is the only 
way that the poorest of covered persons can comply with the mandate. 
Accordingly, the government specifically conceded in the district court that 
―the guaranteed issue and community rating insurance industry reforms in Section 
1201 will stand or fall with the minimum coverage provision‖ because they are not 
severable.  R.E. 1765.  There is no basis for suggesting that the mandate is 
severable from some but not all of the core, interrelated health insurance reforms 
— and the government is careful not to do so in this Court, and not to argue that 
Congress would have enacted any of the ACA‘s core insurance reforms without 
the individual mandate.  As the district court determined, the government‘s broad 
concession that ―the minimum coverage provision is necessary to make the other 
regulations in the Act effective,‖ R.E. 143 (emphasis added), is fatal to any effort 
to sever those regulations.  R.E. 2069, 2074.  
2. The various other provisions of the Act are not severable. 
The government‘s argument that some unidentifiable number of the Act‘s 
other 450 provisions are severable, Govt.‘s Opening Br. 57, misses the mark.  As 
the district court explained, although the other individual tax provisions of the Act 
might have ―no discernable connection to health care,‖ their inclusion was no 
accident; they ―w[ere] intended to generate offsetting revenue‖ for the Act‘s costly 
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central reforms.  R.E. 2074.  As the government aptly put it, ―[w]hen Congress 
passed the ACA, it was careful to ensure that any increased spending, including on 
Medicaid, was offset by other revenue-raising and cost-saving provisions.‖  R.E. 
1024. 
Thus, while the government identifies a handful of provisions that on their 
face may appear to be unrelated to the Act‘s core components, see Govt.‘s Opening 
Br. 56–57, it ignores that Congress carefully calibrated each provision to ensure 
that the financial obligations the Act imposes are equivalent to the revenue and 
savings it generates.  Extracting the individual mandate — the centerpiece — from 
the law would, of course, dramatically change its cost.  But there would be no way 
to determine which offsetting provisions of the ACA Congress would have 
rewritten had the individual mandate not been included. 
Moreover, once one recognizes that the central provisions of the ACA are 
not severable, it is wholly unrealistic to expect the district court to sort through the 
remaining 450 provisions to attempt to divine which Congress would have enacted 
independently.  That is a wholly artificial exercise once the core of the bill is 
removed.  And as the district court observed, ―[g]oing through the 2,700-page Act 
line-by-line, invalidating dozens (or hundreds) of some sections while retaining 
dozens (or hundreds) of others, would not only take considerable time and 
extensive briefing, but it would, in the end, be tantamount to rewriting a statute….‖  
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R.E. 2073–74.  Even the government has not attempted to undertake that exercise 
— it has only proffered some examples of provisions it asserts to be severable.  
Because the government is essentially seeking to rescue Congress from the gamble 
it intentionally employed by crafting the entire ACA around a provision of 
questionable constitutionality, the district court correctly declined to ―‗substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of the government‘‖ by picking and 
choosing among the ACA‘s various provisions.  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (quoting 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)).8   
The government‘s remaining criticisms of the district court‘s analysis are 
equally unfounded.  It first accuses the court of attributing ―unwarranted 
significance to the absence of a severability clause.‖  Govt.‘s Opening Br. 58.  The 
district court did no such thing.  The court expressly recognized that ―‗the absence 
of such a clause … ‗does not raise a presumption against severability.‘‖  R.E. 2068 
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 186).  What the court found significant was 
Congress‘s removal of a severability clause from an earlier version of the bill — a 
                                       
8 Washington State believes that one provision that is arguably different is ACA 
section 10221, which reauthorized and amended the Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act (IHCIA).  The IHCIA pre-existed ACA, and section 10221 
merely involved a reauthorization, which in turn had an independent legislative 
genesis in S. 1790.  Most tellingly, Native Americans served by the IHCIA are 
exempted from the individual mandate by section 1501(b).  But this only 
underscores the difficulty of assessing the severability of the ACA‘s hundreds of 
other miscellaneous provisions which do not address their relationship to the 
individual mandate. 
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version that the House had passed.  That consideration is well within the bounds of 
what the Supreme Court has recognized to be relevant evidence of congressional 
intent.  R.E. 2068 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983)).  
In any event, that was but one factor in the district court‘s severability analysis, 
which relied much more heavily on the court‘s conclusion that the Act ―cannot 
function as originally designed‖ without the ―lynchpin of the entire health reform 
effort‖: the individual mandate.  R.E. 2074, 2068. 
The government also identifies no error by noting that the district court‘s 
severability ruling may ―affect the rights and obligations of parties not before the 
Court.‖  Govt.‘s Opening Br. 60.  Severance is a remedy for Congress‘s benefit, 
not the plaintiff‘s.  See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).  To the 
extent there is any requirement that a plaintiff have standing to raise a severability 
argument, that requirement is satisfied so long as the plaintiff is burdened by any 
of the act‘s remaining provisions.  Compare Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (declining to 
address severance where no remaining provisions affected plaintiffs), with New 
York, 505 U.S. at 186–87 (addressing severability where remaining provisions 
affected plaintiffs).  The States plainly alleged injury in fact resulting from 
multiple provisions of the Act, including the individual mandate, the Medicaid 
expansions, and the employer mandates.  Thus, the district court correctly reached 
and resolved the severability question. 
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B. The District Court Correctly Included All Parties in its Judgment. 
The government concedes that at least one of the individual plaintiffs has 
standing to challenge the individual mandate, Govt.‘s Opening Br. 6 n.1, and it 
does not dispute that the States have standing to challenge the expansion of 
Medicaid.  Nonetheless, the government asserts that the district court erred in 
including the States within the scope of its declaratory relief concerning the 
individual mandate.  It is well settled, however, that so long as at least one plaintiff 
has standing with respect to each claim, a court ―need not consider whether the 
other … plaintiffs have standing.‖  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977); accord Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
518 (2007); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Fund, 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981). 
In any event, the States have standing to challenge the individual mandate 
for at least three separate and independent reasons.  First, the mandate requires all 
individuals to maintain a minimum level of insurance, including individuals who 
are either newly eligible for Medicaid or were previously eligible but had opted not 
to enroll.  As the government has recognized, the mandate will therefore require 
millions more individuals to enroll in Medicaid, imposing millions of dollars in 
additional costs on the States.  Indeed, ―[o]f the additional 34 million people who 
are estimated to be insured by 2019 as a result of the [individual mandate], a little 
more than one-half (18 million) would receive Medicaid coverage due to the 
68 
 
expansion of eligibility.‖  See Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the 
―Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,‖ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., Apr. 22, 2010, at 6, available at https://www.cms.gov/ 
ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf; R.E. 501 n.39.   
That inevitability is not a product of ―unfettered choices made by 
independent actors,‖ ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.), but is a necessary and intended consequence of the ACA, which 
requires covered individuals to secure health insurance, and leaves Medicaid as the 
only option for numerous low-income individuals to comply.  See ACA §§ 
1501(b), 5000A(f)(1)(A).  The States have therefore alleged a ―concrete and 
particularized‖ injury that is ―fairly traceable‖ to the individual mandate and 
redressed by the relief the district court granted.  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 
129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); see also Fla. State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (―probabilistic harm is enough 
injury in fact to confer standing‖) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).    
Second, the States have standing because they have alleged that the 
individual mandate renders the entire Act invalid on non-severability grounds.  The 
States have standing to raise that argument so long as they allege that any of the 
Act‘s provisions causes them injury in fact, as such injury would be remedied by a 
declaration that the Act is invalid.  See Brock, 480 U.S. at 684 (adjudicating claim 
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that entire statute was invalid as a result of unconstitutional legislative veto 
provision, where plaintiffs alleged injury based on other portions of the statute).  
The States have plainly demonstrated injury in fact caused by the Medicaid and 
employer mandate reforms, and therefore have standing to seek invalidation of the 
Act on the ground that the individual mandate is unconstitutional. 
Finally, as the district court found, the States have standing to challenge the 
mandate as an impermissible incursion into their sovereign right to enact and 
enforce legislation mandating that their citizens may not be compelled to purchase 
insurance.  See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 
(1982) (recognizing sovereign‘s interest in its ―power to create and enforce a legal 
code); Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(―States‘ sovereign interest in law enforcement is sufficient to support standing‖).  
That theory of standing is not barred by Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 
(1923), which held only that a State lacks standing when it demonstrates no ―quasi 
sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened‖ by the statute in question.  Id. at 
485. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment below 
invalidating the ACA in its entirety.
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